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Abstract
I propose two new tests of Falk and Knell’s (2004) prediction that individuals’
reference income increases with ability. To overcome the diﬃculty that the reference
income is not observed in existing large data sets, I extend Falk and Knell’s model
to establish a link between immigrants’ reference income and their return visits
to their countries of origin. I derive the (arguably counter-intuitive) predictions
that more educated immigrants are less likely to have returned to their country of
origin for a visit, and that they are more likely to have diﬃculty feeling at home
when they do return for a visit. Both predictions are conﬁrmed on four waves of
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The estimated marginal eﬀects are
statistically signiﬁcant, but rather small in size.
Keywords: reference standard, social comparison, immigration, Germany
JEL codes: D62, D63, H31, Z13
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would like to thank Joachim Frick for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and the
Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) for ﬁnancial support.1 Introduction
A large number of studies has shown that self-reported satisfaction with one’s life or
income is correlated with reference group income.1 However, a central diﬃculty in these
studies is that the researcher usually does not observe with whom people compare their
income. It is typically assumed that people compare themselves to others who are similar
in terms of age, gender, education, region, or occupation. Although the conclusions about
the importance of relative income for self-reported satisfaction and for observed behaviour
(e.g., savings behaviour or the decision to emigrate) may hinge on the assumption about
the reference group, the assumption is never tested in these empirical studies.
There is clearly a need to ﬁnd out more about the determinants of a person’s refer-
ence group. In this paper I test the prediction that the reference standard (for income
comparisons) increases in a person’s productive ability. The prediction is derived from
a model by Falk and Knell (2004), who are among the ﬁrst to endogenize the reference
standard. In their model, individuals trade oﬀ a self-enhancement motive (choosing a low
comparison income to make oneself feel good) against what Falk and Knell call a self-
improvement motive: aiming high in one’s comparison in order to be more motivated,
and thus more productive, at work. Falk and Knell’s main result is that, at least under
their assumptions about functional form, the optimal comparison income increases in a
person’s productive ability. Falk and Knell show for 255 students at two universities in
Zurich that there is indeed a positive correlation between high-school grade (their proxy
for ability) and aspired grade on the ﬁnal university exam, even controlling for a number
of possible common inﬂuences. As far as I know, this is the only test of their model so
far.
The diﬃculty with any empirical test is that, to my knowledge, the reference standard for
income comparisons is not observed in existing large data sets. As a way around, I propose
to focus on immigrants (an application that Falk and Knell themselves suggest), and I
assume that return visits are a way of adjusting one’s standard for income comparisons.
By extending Falk and Knell’s model in this way, I am able to derive the two predictions
that other things equal better educated immigrants (1) will return to their former home
countries less often, and (2) will have greater diﬃculty feeling at home when they do
return to their countries of origin. These two predictions are counter-intuitive, but can
be explained by the eﬀorts of more highly educated immigrants to maintain the higher
native reference standard. The use of education as a proxy for ability follows the test
1See the recent survey by Clark et al. (2008). McBride (2001) and Luttmer (2005) are two of the
best-known studies for the U.S.; for Germany, see the studies by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Schwarze and
Winkelmann (2005), Schwarze and Härpfer (2007), and D’Ambrosio and Frick (2007).
1that Falk and Knell themselves carry out.
I test the two predictions using data from ﬁve waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel
(for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004), which has a large number of observations
on immigrants and a rich array of questions related to immigration. Both predictions
are tentatively conﬁrmed. In probit and ordered probit models controlling for a large
number of other factors, I ﬁnd that better educated immigrants are indeed less likely to
have visited their countries of origin, and that when they did return for a visit, they report
greater diﬃculty feeling at home. The eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant, but rather small
in size: a one standard deviation (i.e., about 2.5 years) diﬀerence in years of schooling
reduces the probability of a return visit by approximately 0.7 percentage points, and is
associated with a probability of feeling at home straight away that is lower by about
1.5 percentage points. Both marginal eﬀects are small compared to the marginal eﬀects
of variables such as household income, distance to the country of origin, or dummies for
having left the country of origin because of a war or because of a lack of political freedom.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I brieﬂy sketch Falk and
Knell’s model. Section 3 presents the two empirical tests. Section 4 describes the data,
and 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Falk and Knell’s model of endogenous reference
income
Preferences are represented by the utility function
Ui = U(ci,ri) (1)
where ci is own consumption and ri is the consumption of a reference group. Falk and
Knell assume that envy dominates altruism, that is, ∂U/∂ri < 0. For own consumption,
they make the usual assumption that more consumption is preferred to less: ∂U/∂ci > 0.
The reference consumption r is usually assumed to be exogenous, which is, according
to Falk and Knell, “at odds with ﬁndings from social psychology according to which
reference standards are to some extent actively chosen” (p.3). To relax this assumption,
they postulate that a person’s comparison income is the weighted average of an exogenous
part x and an actively chosen part gi:
ri = (1 − q)x + qgi, (2)
2where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Under the assumptions so far, a utility-maximizing individual will set gi
equal to zero, for if inter-personal comparisons are dominated by envy and schadenfreude,
the best way to feel good is to compare oneself to the very poor. Falk and Knell call this
the “self-enhancement motive.”
However, introspection as well as casual and more systematic observation (see Wood and
Taylor (1991) for references) suggest that this is not the only motive behind the choice
of a reference standard. As Falk and Knell note, “people compare themselves to improve
their performance. In fact there is a large body of evidence indicating that people perform
better if they compare themselves with others who are more successful. Thus performing
upward comparisons has an indirect positive eﬀect on overall utility since it facilitates
performance” (p.2; italics added). Falk and Knell call this the “self-improvement motive”;
it enters the utility function indirectly, through the production function, and therefore
falls under what Manski (2000) calls “constraint interaction.”
Under these assumptions it is no longer clear that individuals will choose the lowest possi-
ble reference standard, and their optimal choice will depend on the relative importance of
self-enhancement and self-improvement. What will this relative importance depend on?
Falk and Knell focus on productive ability ai. They assume that consumption increases
with eﬀort ei and with ability ai:
ci = aiei (3)
where ∂ci/∂ai > 0 and ∂ci/∂ei > 0. Ability ai is exogenous in their model and is the
only source of heterogeneity between individuals.






where γ ≡ θq and ∂k/∂ei > 0. The innovation in their model is that ∂k/∂gi < 0, that
is, the cost of eﬀort decreases with the reference standard: this is the self-improvement
motive.
Finally, this cost of eﬀort is incorporated into the utility function, which Falk and Knell
assume to be of the form
Ui = αln[(1 − θ)ci + θ(ci − ri)] − β ln[k(ei,gi)] (5)
Falk and Knell show that under these assumptions the optimal reference standard in-
creases with ability, that is, ∂g∗
i/∂ai > 0. The intuition is that a higher reference stan-
dard makes eﬀort less costly for everybody (γ and δ in equation (4) being the same for
3everybody), but that individuals with higher productive ability will beneﬁt more from
this reduction in the cost of eﬀort. At the extreme, if somebody’s consumption is com-
pletely unaﬀected by own eﬀort, he will choose the reference standard as low as possible,
since he cannot beneﬁt from the self-improvement eﬀect of a higher reference standard,
whereas he suﬀers from envy like everybody else.
Falk and Knell show for 255 students at two universities in Zurich that there is indeed a
positive correlation between high-school grade (their proxy for ability) and aspired grade
on the ﬁnal university exam (their measure of a reference standard), even controlling for
a number of possible common inﬂuences. As far as I know, this is the only test of their
model so far.
3 Empirical strategy
The objective of this paper is to ﬁnd a new empirical test of Falk and Knell’s prediction
that people’s reference income increases in ability. Unfortunately, however, the reference
income is not observed in the data sets that I am aware of. Whereas Falk and Knell
opt for collecting these data themselves (and are therefore limited to a small number of
observations), I propose an alternative way that can be conducted using existing large
N data sets. Of course, the tests I propose replace the missing observation on reference
income by additional identifying assumptions, so any empirical test is a joint test of Falk
and Knell’s predictions and my auxiliary assumptions.
The additional assumptions have to establish a link between the unobserved variable
“reference income” and some observable variable. I propose to focus on immigrants, an
application that Falk and Knell themselves suggest.2
3.1 Probability of a return visit
My idea is to exploit information on a particular aspect of the migration experience,
namely return visits of a migrant to his or her country of origin. I assume that return
visits vi have an inﬂuence on an immigrant’s reference income, that is, gi = λivi, where
λi < 0 if the average consumption in the country of origin is lower than in Germany. The
idea is that in this case return visits refresh memories of the lower average income in the
country of origin, and that this will lower the immigrant’s reference income.
2The idea that the migration decision is inﬂuenced not only by concerns about absolute, but also by
concerns about relative income goes back to Oded Stark; his early contributions are collected in Stark
(1991).
4The relationship between return visits and ability can be derived directly from Falk and
Knell’s main proposition. Falk and Knell (2004, 433) show that the optimal reference










Under the additional assumption that I make, the comparative statics result for the
optimal number of return visits v∗














That is, a model with costless return visits predicts that other things equal, people with
higher ability will return less often to their countries of origin.
In reality return visits are not costless, of course. However, while the direct monetary
costs of a visit (ticket prices etc.) will depend on the distance to the country of origin (a
variable that I can control for), it is plausible to assume that once distance is controlled
for, these direct costs are independent of the immigrant’s ability (and of the immigrant’s
education, which I use as a proxy for ability in the empirical part below.) By contrast,
other costs, which are less amenable to formal modelling, may well diﬀer by education; for
instance, more educated immigrants are more likely to emigrate for political reasons, and
they are therefore more likely to be in danger when returning to their country of origin. I
attempt to control for such third factors; see the discussion in section 4 below. A last issue
that needs to be discussed are the opportunity costs of a return visit. In the basic labour
supply model, the opportunity cost of an hour of leisure is the foregone consumption; if
the hourly wage diﬀers between people, so will the opportunity cost of leisure. However,
the present paper studies not the choice of leisure, but the choice of how this leisure is
spent: namely, whether people return to their countries of origin for a visit, or whether
they stay in Germany or go to some other country. That is, the choice that is modelled
here can be thought of as conditional on a given amount of leisure. The concept of leisure
that seems to be most relevant here is the amount of paid vacation an employee is entitled
to. In Germany, most employees have between ﬁve and six weeks of paid vacation a year;
this amount varies mainly by age and tenure and not by education, which is the regressor
of interest here. In conclusion, then, the opportunity cost of a return visit in terms of
foregone earnings is essentially zero for employees; any variation in the opportunity cost
that does exist will mainly be captured by a control for age, and the remaining variation
after the adjustment for age is assumed to be independent of education. For the self-
employed, who are free to choose the number of days of vacation, this argument does not
hold, and I therefore exclude the self-employed from the estimation.
5To turn equation (7) into an estimable equation, I follow Falk and Knell (2004) and
assume that education can proxy for ability ai. Moreover, I include a vector of control
variables x, which will be discussed below, and an error term εi that is assumed to be
distributed standard normally and independent of the regressors:
v
∗
i = ζ0 + ζ1Educationi + x
0
iγ + εi (8)
The optimal number of return visits v∗
i is an unobserved continuous variable. I assume
that it is linked to an observed binary variable dV isiti, which measures whether an
immigrant has ever returned for a visit to his or her country of origin:
dV isiti = 1(v
∗
i > 0), (9)
where 1(·) is the indicator function. These assumptions lead to the the probit model
P(dV isiti = 1 | Educationi,xi) = Φ(ζ0 + ζ1Educationi + x
0
iγ), (10)
where Φ(·) is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. The model is estimated by
maximum likelihood.
3.2 Feelings during return visit
As a second test of Falk and Knell’s model, I test the hypothesis that better educated
immigrants will have greater diﬃculty feeling at home when they do return to their
countries of origin. Unlike the ﬁrst prediction, this second prediction is not justiﬁed
by a theoretical model since modeling feelings appears to be a more diﬃcult task. The
informal argument behind the hypothesis is as follows: Falk and Knell (2004) argue that
immigrants with higher ability (or education) are more likely to adopt a higher reference
income. I add the auxiliary hypothesis that a higher reference income will estrange
immigrants from their countries of origin, and that they will therefore have a harder
time feeling at home when returning to their country of origin. To test the prediction,
I estimate an ordered probit model for immigrant’s feelings on their return visits, again
attempting to control for common inﬂuences.
64 Data
I use data from ﬁve waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a longitudinal
survey of private households which began in 1984.3 The GSOEP over-samples immigrants
and contains a rich array of questions related to immigration, which makes the data well-
suited for my purpose. In particular, in the waves of 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004,
immigrants were asked about return visits to their countries of origin.
For the purpose of this paper, I deﬁne an immigrant as a respondent who was born outside
of Germany, regardless of nationality at the time of the survey. By contrast, I do not
include in this category people who “immigrated” from East Germany before 1989, and
Germans who had been living abroad and then returned to Germany. As noted above,
I drop self-employed immigrants because for them the assumption that the number of
days of vacation is given is less convincing. The resulting estimation sample consists
of 7822 person-year observations. Depending on the speciﬁcation, the actual number of
observations will be somewhat lower due to the listwise deletion of missing values. Figure












































































































































































Figure 1: Five countries of origin with most person-year observations
3The data are available from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) at the German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. See Wagner et al. (2007) for a detailed description of
the GSOEP.
74.1 Dependent variables
In the ﬁve waves of the GSOEP that I use, immigrants are asked: “since you have come
to Germany to live, have you visited your country of origin?” As ﬁgure 2 shows, for about









































































































Figure 2: Have you ever visited your country of origin?
There is also a question on how immigrants feel when they do visit country of origin. The
question runs: “When some people have lived for a long time in Germany and visit their
(former) home country, things may have changed. How is that for you? How do you feel
in that situation?” The ﬁve answer categories are “I feel at home right away on the ﬁrst
day, as if I hadn’t ever been away”; “I feel at home within a short time”; “at ﬁrst I feel
like a stranger, but after a few days I feel at home”; “it takes quite a long time until I
feel more or less at home”; “I feel like a stranger in my own country.” Figure 3 shows
how the answers are distributed in the sample. Most immigrants report to feel at home
quickly, but about 20% of people in the sample report considerable diﬃculty feeling at
home when visiting their country of origin.
4.2 Regressor of interest
My regressor of interest is education in years, which I use as a proxy for ability. As table
3 shows, the variable ranges from 7 to 18 years, with a sample mean of about 10.8 years.



























































































































































































































Figure 3: Feel at home in country of origin
of schooling. The means are 9.9 years for those who have returned versus 10.6 years for
those who have never returned. The diﬀerence in the means is statistically signiﬁcant.
The boxplot in ﬁgure 4 shows that the median is lower as well for those immigrants who
have returned for a visit.
4.3 Control variables
Better education (as a proxy for ability) is correlated with a number of other factors
that will also aﬀect the probability of a return visit. As table 5 shows, immigrants who
have median or above-median years of schooling tend to be male, younger, of better
self-reported health, and tend to live in smaller households than immigrants with below
median years of schooling. More years of schooling are associated with much higher
household income, a lower unemployment rate, and a higher probability of owning the
house or appartment in which one lives. While these correlation patterns also hold true
for natives (not reported here), the table shows some interesting associations that are
speciﬁc to immigrants. Quite strikingly, better educated immigrants are twice as likely
to report that they came to live in freedom or to escape a war in their country of origin.
By contrast, there is little diﬀerence with respect to whether the immigrant still has
family abroad; for this variable, the share of positive answers is almost 100%, regardless
of educational level.


















































































































































Figure 4: Immigrants who have returned for a visit have fewer years of schooling on
average
return visit, and should therefore be controlled for in the multivariate analysis below. For
instance, immigrants who have been back for a visit tend to come from countries that
are closer to Germany, tend to have higher household income, tend to be older and to
have resided in Germany for a longer time, and are slightly more likely to have family
abroad. Other striking diﬀerences concern the self-reported reasons for migrating: people
who came to live in freedom or to escape war are much less likely to have returned for a
visit, presumably because they are more likely to be in danger when returning. People
who received only a “limited residence permit” when they arrived in Germany are also
less likely to have returned for a visit, presumably because they expect having diﬃculty
when they re-enter.4 Of course, these are all bivariate associations only; the multivari-
ate analysis below will show whether these diﬀerences still exist once other factors are
controlled for.
4The GSOEP contains this information only for the arrival in Germany; the current residence status
is not reported.
105 Results
5.1 Probability of a return visit
Table 1 shows the results from the probit model deﬁned above. The table reports esti-
mated marginal eﬀects at the sample mean.
The prediction that education decreases the probability of a return visit is supported by
the data. The estimated marginal eﬀect is -0.007 in the bivariate model. When individual
characteristics are controlled for, the marginal eﬀect is larger in absolute value (-0.0096),
which mainly reﬂects the fact that, as seen above, more educated immigrants tend to
have higher household income, and that people with higher income tend to return for a
visit more often. Once income is controlled for, the negative association between return
visits and years of schooling is stronger, as witnessed by the second column. In columns
3 and 4, further controls are added, which drive down the estimated marginal eﬀect of
years of schooling. This is most apparent in the comparison between columns 2 and 3:
controlling for distance to the country of origin and for the reasons for emigration reduces
the estimated marginal eﬀect from -0.0096 to -0.0025. As noted above, this reﬂects the
fact that more educated immigrants are more likely to have left their country of origin
for political reasons (“left because of war”, “came to live in freedom”), and that people
who came for these reasons tend to return less often, presumably because a return visit
is more dangerous for them. By contrast, the two controls that are added in column
4 (namely, unemployment status and house ownership as a proxy for wealth) aﬀect the
estimated marginal eﬀect of education much less.
The estimated marginal eﬀect on years of schooling is -0.0028 in column 4. This marginal
eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant, but relatively small in size: a diﬀerence of ten years
of education (which corresponds to more than four standard deviations!) aﬀects the
probability of a return visit by only about three percentage points (recall from above
that about 91% of immigrants have returned to their country of origin for a visit).
To put this marginal eﬀect into perspective, a one standard deviation (i.e., about 2.5
years) diﬀerence in years of schooling has a marginal eﬀect of approximately -0.007, that
is, of less than one percentage point. By comparison, the standard deviation of monthly
household net income is 1776 euros per month. Hence, a one standard deviation increase
in income increases the probability of a return visit by 1.776 · 0.028 ≈ 0.05, that is, by
ﬁve percentage points (recall that the income variable is expressed in 1000 euros, hence
the multiplication by 1.776 and not by 1776). Note that the eﬀects of both education













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12origin because of a war or because of a lack of political freedom.
5.2 Feelings during return visit
Table 2 shows estimated marginal eﬀects from an ordered probit model. The dependent
variable measures how long it took the immigrant to feel at home when visiting his or
her country of origin. The variable has ﬁve categories. Only the marginal eﬀects for
the ﬁrst category ( “I feel at home right away on the ﬁrst day, as if I hadn’t ever been
away.”) are reported. These marginal eﬀects are again evaluated at the sample means of
the covariates.
The main result is that the prediction that better educated immigrants have greater dif-
ﬁculty feeling at home is conﬁrmed. This is arguably a counter-intuitive ﬁnding since one
would expect that more educated people are better at adapting to all kinds of circum-
stances. As noted, I propose to explain this observation using Falk and Knell (2004)’s
model that predicts that better educated immigrants will choose a higher reference in-
come; I add the hypothesis that a higher reference income will estrange an immigrant
from his or her (low-income) country of origin, which could explain the diﬃculty feeling
at home. The estimated marginal eﬀects are again statistically signiﬁcant, but relatively
small: a one standard deviation increase in the years of schooling is associated with a
probability of feeling at home straight away that is lower by 2.5 · (−0.0058) ≈ −0.015,
that is, by 1.5 percentage points. By comparison, having left to “come to live in freedom”
is associated with a probability that is lower by about 14 percentage points.
5.3 Robustness check
The assumption that return visits to the country of origin lower the reference income is
credible only if the average income is lower in the country of origin than in Germany.
I therefore re-estimated the models dropping the 2756 immigrants (37% of the sample)
from the EU-15 countries, Switzerland, Norway, the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, and
Korea. Tables 6 and 7 in the appendix show that the coeﬃcients on education are again
negative and, as expected, slightly large in absolute value.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed two new tests of Falk and Knell (2004)’s prediction that













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14reference income is not observed in existing large N data sets, I have extended their
model to establish a link between immigrants’ reference income and their return visits to
their countries of origin. I have derived the two (arguably counter-intuitive) predictions
that more educated immigrants are less likely to have returned to their country of origin
for a visit, and that they are more likely to have diﬃculty feeling at home when they do
return for a visit. Both predictions are conﬁrmed on four waves of data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel. The estimated marginal eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant, but
rather small in size.
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16A Appendix
Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Ever visited country of origin 0.91 . 0 1 7702
Diﬃculty feeling at home on visit 2.34 1.10 1 5 7122
Years of schooling 10.05 2.48 7 18 7348
Male 0.50 . 0 1 7822
Age 44.17 14.21 17 88 7822
Not working, unemployed 0.10 . 0 1 7822
Owns residence he or she lives in 0.20 . 0 1 7822
Household size 3.43 1.52 1 13 7822
Child under 16 in household 0.48 . 0 1 7822
Single 0.10 . 0 1 7786
Married 0.80 . 0 1 7786
Married but separated 0.02 . 0 1 7786
Divorced 0.05 . 0 1 7786
Widowed 0.03 . 0 1 7786
Years since migration 22.44 10.44 0 52 7066
Distance to Frankfurt (in km) 1965.68 1364.35 192 16468 7730
Health poor or bad 0.20 . 0 1 7808
Monthly household net income 2314.30 1776.31 183 101522 7460
Family abroad 0.98 . 0 1 820
Left because of war 0.02 . 0 1 7822
Came to live in freedom 0.02 . 0 1 7822
Limited residence permit on arrival 0.07 . 0 1 7822
Year = 1996 0.22 . 0 1 7822
Year = 1998 0.19 . 0 1 7822
Year = 2000 0.24 . 0 1 7822
Year = 2002 0.19 . 0 1 7822
Year = 2004 0.16 . 0 1 7822
Note: GSOEP 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004. Real income is in 2005 euros.
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